as the blocking power of patents stymies innovation by product users. As with the waterways, the total value of the resources under patents (if not the number of patents themselves) should diminish as productive avenues for research cannot be pursued by individuals are cut off from the nourishment that their own inventive efforts obtain from a rich public domain. The pursuit of private gain leads to a loss of social welfare. Eisenberg and Heller suppose, then we should expect to a decline in the levels of research and development, the value of new patented materials, or the number of patents filed and
granted. Yet there is little evidence that this as taken place, and none that would assign any of that supposed decline to the creation of an anticommons, as opposed to the general insecurity that could arise from a fear that the current intellectual and political climate will undermine the present levels of patent protection.
One reason why the Heller and Eisenberg model fails is that it is based, we believe, on a set of faulty analogies. Above we instanced the blocking power that exists whenever multiple owners control different segments of a river. In that instance, nature supplies an effective barrier against any form of innovation that could offer new routes to travel along the river. It is only when the railroads and highways are built that technological circumvention is possible, and even here, the possibility remains that the same political forces that block the effective utilization of the river will also disrupt any alternative modes of transportation that have to pass through multiple sovereign jurisdictions. There is a natural rigidity here that has no parallel in the rapidly moving world of biomedical research.
Within the American framework, for example, the great institutional achievement of the "dormant" commerce clause jurisprudence is that it provided a judicial counterweight to this form of favoritism. To be sure, the commerce clause itself (Congress has the power to regulate commerce . . . among the several states,") does not in any obvious sense impose a limitation on the power of states to regulate transportation and communication that cuts across state lines. But the Supreme Court's early willingness to find an implicit negative predicate to that grant of power-states cannot discriminate against out of state commerce without an explicit blessing from Congressmade it very difficult for states to favor local businesses at the expense of outsiders and thus effectively countered the tendency of states to stop traffic at the border. With a few exceptions, this open access system has held firm. The common sovereign over the local territories provides the antidote to the dangers of blockade. The institutional setting must be taken into account before conceding the power of the analogy.
The same conclusion applies with even greater force to the examples that Heller relied on in his original article on the now-fabled Anticommons. 5 That article started with the observation that the socialist system in place in the Soviet Union had all sorts of empty storefronts, as merchants set up informal stands on the sidewalks. It rightly attributed the utter lack of economic activity to the veto power that different branches of Soviet government could exercise through their permit power. But permits and patents differ in many important particulars. The permit power requires an individual to get permission for some activity from a state bureaucrat. But the state bureaucrat is not the owner of any asset whose value will remain unlocked unless he brings it to market.
Whether some activity goes forward or not may make an enormous difference to the power of that office, but often in perverse ways. The greater the level of supervision, the larger the credible demands for expanded budget allocations. The stronger the holdup potential of the office, then the greater the willingness of individuals to bribe. But the more permits that are needed to open any individual business, the less any individual bribe will achieve, so that in the end the rational result may well be to shutter windows and lock doors altogether except for the would-be entrant with high-level political clout that allows him to circumvent the permit process altogether. There is indeed an enormous difference between a permit thicket through which all entrepreneurs must pass and the traditional judicial system of injunctive relief that provides in effect that some neighbor can stop activities that either cause harm or hold out the threat of imminent harm, to his own property. 6 The patent system, however, differs from the permit system that prompted Heller's original investigation. The holder of a patent has the intention to make money from its utilization. The refusal to deal in any individual case is not the source of additional political power; nor a source of additional claims from public revenue. It is the loss of opportunity. In addition, the patent is always a wasting asset. Not only is it limited in time, but even during the period of its unquestioned validity, its holder faces the possibility that new patents, old patents that have expired, new techniques that come into the public domain, will all erode its dominance. Those who do not deal will not prosper, so that the entire culture works in ways that encourage various forms of cooperation.
Precisely because any patent holder can legitimately claim a share of the profits from a cooperative venture, the patent system differs decisively from the permit system, with its evident pathologies.
We think our view of the patent system is borne out by the empirical evidence.
We have already noted the high velocity of transactions in cultures that are dominated by entrepreneurs. That same result is confirmed in connection with research tools in a recent study a recent study, 7 briefly summarized in Science. 8 Walsh, Arora and Cohen surveyed 6 70 attorneys, scientists and managers in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries to detect evidence of the patent blockade. Almost none of the recipients thought that the current legal patent regime had posed insurmountable obstacles that prevented the effective use of research tools. Instead they noted that both in industry and universities, researchers had adopted strategies of "licensing, inventing around patents, going offshore, the development and use of public databases and research tools, court challenges and simply using the technology without a license (i.e. infringement) to achieve their particular goals." 9 In principle, we have to have some licensing of new inventions for otherwise they would not be patented at all. Any blockade therefore is undermined pro tanto by this activity. Inventing around a current patent need not, moreover, be regarded as a wasteful activity for it will expand the options available to others whether that invention is patented or put into the public domain. The legal monopolies created by patents do not necessarily translate into economic blockades.
Patent proliferation could easily provide alternative stepping-stones to new production, creating perhaps Cournot duopolies with lower prices across the board. 10 Or a new family of anti-inflammatory drugs could compete with an old one, as happens with Celebrex® and Vioxx®. The rapid development of new inventions with limited term protection, moreover, only hastens the time at which technology falls into the public domain. Even patent infringement should not necessarily be regarded as dangerous in this context, for most patent holders reported "tolerating" academic research in the hopes that it would increase the commercial market for their products. 11 The situation is far from elegant, but patent protection at all-should remain the dominant approach in patent law.
The debate over the nature and scope of patent protection has taken on special urgency in connection with pharmaceutical products. Industry estimates place the cost of bringing a successful new drug to market at around $800 million per drug, including the cost of "dry holes," with a 12 to 15 year period of gestation. 16 Yet the marginal cost of another pill is often tiny by comparison. Once the prescription drug goes off patent, its price as a generic plummets because the new entrants do not have to amortize the initial costs of R&D over the life of the drug. The high-initial but low marginal costs of drug development leave many groups clamoring to hasten the introduction of low-cost generics. Right now the rates of return for pharmaceutical firms have been high, but these reflect the riskiness of the venture given the free entry into the industry, and, some would argue, the implicit protection against competition supplied by the stringent set of nonnegotiable FDA licensing requirements. Moreover, market capitalizations have fallen in recent years in part because of the looming uncertainty as to the future protection of 15 The key policy question recently addressed by Congress and the FDA is whether to maintain the basic structure under Hatch-Waxman. That Act has a number of key features. First, it extends the length of a patent to partially offset the reduction in patent useful length for the pre-approval clinical trials required by the FDA: one day is restored to a patent for each two days consumed in the clinical study process and for each day consumed by FDA review of the new drug application, up to a maximum of five years, so long as the total useful patent life does not exceed 14 years. That restoration of course comes at the end of the patent period, where its present value is far lower than the early years that are lost, even if we ignore the potential depreciation in product value. Given this restoration period, moreover, effective patent lives in the pharmaceutical industry typically run only 6-9 years, as compared with more than 18 in other industries. 18 Second, Hatch-Waxman simplifies and expedites the process for developing and approving generic copies of innovator drugs in several respects. It takes away innovator patent rights by creating a special exemption under the patent law, which permits the generic firm to manufacture and test its drug during the incumbent's patent period. It also strips innovators of the exclusive and perpetual rights to their data on safety and . The statute provides that only patents listed with FDA before the generic files its application will be eligible for the 30-month stay. As a practical matter, this will usually mean that there is only one stay, but in some cases a second stay will be available based on the timing of the generic's challenges to the eligible patents. The new law supersedes FDA's regulations and
This change in Hatch-Waxman is said to be justified by the fear that patent holders will string together several weak patents to keep generics out of the marketplace beyond the initial patent period. But this rationale is flawed for a number of reasons. First, the basic patent system denies any patent for new inventions that do not constitute a nonobvious advance over the prior art. 23 Second, even if such small advances did run the patent gauntlet, they will by definition provide only limited protection for any patent holder. On expiration of the original patent, the generic need only market the older product at a small price discount to offset the supposedly trivial improvements from the new patent. number of fronts. First, the Reid Amendment to S. 812, for example, proposed to make unlawful for any manufacturer to discriminate against any pharmacist or purchaser of prescription drugs. 25 In addition, the bill would have set that single nondiscriminatory price for the drug at the lowest price charged to any nonhumanitarian and noncharitable organization, domestic or foreign. With one stroke, this bill would have eliminated provides a technically superior approach in any event (since FDA was bound by the prior statutory terms, which it and others had consistently interpreted to allow for multiple stays revenues than it could have collected through market-based pricing even in the absence of Medicaid. In cases where the Medicaid subsidy is no longer in play, no system of patent protection is worth its salt if it can be defeated by a clever system of price controls.
Indeed even if some nominal subsidy is provided by the states, the restrictions on pricing should never be raised to the point where they reduce the returns from the patent monopoly, lest an ounce of subsidy be used to authorize a pound of compensation. limitations dealing with easier subject matter have been struck down for failing to allow "a sufficient opportunity to vindicate a claim. 29 Conclusion Biomedical innovation is always at political risk because firms must risk huge amounts of capital today that they can only recover with tomorrow's sales.
Without ample patent protection, no combination of first mover advantages or altruism will generate the capital sums needed. Reducing the patentees' right to exclude or its power to price counts as a partial repeal of the patent grant with mischievous social consequences. A direct frontal assault on the patent system generates little support given the social demand for innovation. But indirect attacks on the patent system could escape widespread social condemnation while eroding the protection that the patent system can supply its holders. It is therefore critical that we recognize that the past successes in biomedical innovation arise because the gains from innovation exceed any small dislocations from the so-called anticommons. Whatever one thinks of the recent changes to Hatch-Waxman, the legal institutions now in place are not in need of any major repair. 30 But new fronts are constantly emerging, and these institutions must be held firm against the multiple attacks on their integrity. 29 Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co., 132 F. 434 (8th Cir 1904). The Hatch-Waxman amendments recently passed by Congress do not include these other objectionable provisions from S. 812. The 30-month stay provision as passed is better than what was in S. 812 because more patents are eligible for the stay under the new law. The new law also includes other changes in Hatch-Waxman, most notably in the operation of the 180-day exclusivity provision intended as an incentive to generics to challenge patents. 30 The generic industry's trade association, the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, supported the recent law and stated that it was sufficient to address the alleged abuses that had been identified and to speed generics to market. 
